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ESTATE PLANS AND ARRANGEMENTS 
TO AVOID _llJCDf'1E TAX 
PART I INTRODUCTION 
A. THE PROBLEM DEFINED 
One of the problems foremost in the mind of an estate plannor 
will be the implications that anj prospective scheme will bear on 
the liability to income tax. Whilst the cardinal objective may 
be the desire to minimise estate duty~ that course of action 
involving the least, periodic contribution to the fisc may also 
be expected to be an important determinant factor. The question 
that then arises is the extent to which the latter considoration 
may be permitted to influence the course of action taken to fulfil 
the former objective? Hanging over the intended estate plan, 
somewhat like the sword of Damocles, is section 99 of the Income 
~ Tax Act 1976. This provision, a generic anti-avoidance measure, 
denies fiscal efficacy to every arrangement that has the purpose 
or effect of the avoidance of income tax. Hence the issue this 
paper will deal with will be to examine the circumstances in 
which a taxpayer may rely on the argument of innocence that he 
was merely implementing an estate plan, when the fall of that 
sword is imminent and he is called upon to refute an application 
of section 99. And, for the sake of brevity, this contention 
that the alleged arrangement to avoid income tax was but an 
exercise in estate planning will throughout this paper be referred 
to as 11 the estate planning argument". 
B. OUTLINE J)F THE MATERIAL TO BE SURVEYED 
With the law on section 99 ~aving been built up almost 
er1tirely by judicial preced ~nt, the approach of this paper will be 
to undertake a case-by-casa analysis of the material jurisprudence 
in order that some resolution of the issue may be postulated. 
1 as charged by section 3 of the Estate and Gift Duties Act 
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Reference will in the first instance be made to local case 
law on the subject. The noxt Part will examine the treatment 
accorded the problem in relation to A~stralia's legislative 
analogue, the essence of which will be to draw out the sharply 
contrasting approach there taken despite the s~milar ancestry 
of the two provisions. 1 The third Part will raise some of the 
possible arguments that may be made by the hapless estate planner 
intent upon prevent i ng th a t s word of Damocles decipitating his 
estate plan. 
C. REFERENCES 
All of tho material New Ze aland c a s e law to date has arisen 
from a consideration of the legislative forebear to sectiun 99, 
being section 108 of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954. 2 Whilst 
the n ew section ha s consider nbly expanded upon the terms of its 
predece s sor, the ba s ic thrust common to both sections - to negate 
the fiscal effect of tax avoid a nGs arr angements - is still the 
same. He nce the principles e stablishe d under the former provision 3 
may under our doctrine of precedent be applied when resolving 
issues that arise under its legislative successor. To avoid 
possible confusion amongst the sections of the respective Tax 
Acts, ill refer e nces in this pap e r will be to the provisions of 
the 1976 Act. Furthermore, the various provisions studied 
together with the relevant case law decided thereunder, are set 
out in the Appendix to this pa per. Hence any reference to this 
paper will be to the citation as refer ed to in_ the Appendix. 
1 
2 
3 
tJhich is traced through hy North P. in Elm.i.. qsr at pages 176-7 
and the Privy Council in Ma n9.i£2 at .pages 594-5 and 600. 
repealed by section 436 of tl1 e Incom e Tax Act 1976, which statute 
appli e s in ros pect, of the t a x on inco·nc d eri v ed i n t he i n co me y ci ,Jr 
co mme ncing 1st Ap ri 1977. So e s,1(2) of th e 1976 Ac t. 
alluded to at pa ge 5 below. 
3. 
PART II NEW ZEALAN~ 
A. JUDICIAL APPROACH ES TO TAX AVOIDANCE 
Learned memb e rs of the judici a ry have from time to time stated 
their view as to the pr op e r approach to be taken by the Court to 
problems of tax avoid a nc e. Some of these various comments were 
alluded to by Woodhouse J. in Elmige r~ in a judgment which, though 
one of ou r earlie s t, still stands as one of the most lucid 
expo s itions on the qu est i on of th e proper approach to be taken 
to proble ms arising und er s ection 99. His Honour noted the conflict 
betwe en the view exp re ss e d by Lord Tomlin in Duke of We stminster
2 -
that every person is entitled to organise his affairs so as to pay 
less tax than he otherwi se might - and the point made by Viscount 
Simon L.C. in La tillaY that to allow him to do so is to incre a se 
pro tanto the burden of t a x on the other, more law abiding citizenry. 
Matters have not rested at that point however, for Lord Reid took 
up the question in Greenb er g, to make the telling observation that: 
''We seem to have trave lled a long way from the general 
and salutary rule th a t the subject is not be t a xed 
except by plain word s . But I must r e cognise that plain 
words are seldom ad e quate to anticipat e and forestall 
the multiplicity of ingeniou s schemes which are 
constantly being devis e d to evade taxation. Parli&nent 
is very prop e rly de t ermined to prevent this kind of tax 
evasion and, if the courts find it impossible to give 
very wide me a nings lo ge nernl phrases, the only 
alternative may be f o r Parliament to do as some other 
countries have done, a nd introduce legislation of a 
more sweeping character which will put the ordinary 
well-intentioned pe rs on at much great e r risk tt,an is 
created by a wid e interp r etation of such provisions as 
those which we are now corisidering."4 
1 at pages 686-688 
2 at page 19 
3 at pago 266. A conte ntion found to bo unconvincing, on the 
ground that, in any event, governments are inclined to overtax. 
See Vineberg, at pages 31 - 32 . . 
4 at pa90 149. A view endor sed by Lord Wilb e rfo r ce in loin~ , 
at page· 1055 
4. 
However the last word on the subject was written by Lord Simon 
of Glaisdale~ who argued for tho Courts to apply a strict 
interpretation to taxing statutes on the basis that whilst -
''It may seem hard that a cunningly advised taxpayer 
should be able to avoid what appears to be his 
equitabl0 share of the general fiscal burden and 
cast it an the shoulders of his fellow citizens. 
But for the courts to try to stretch the law to 
meet hard cases •.•. is not merely to make bad law 
but to run the risk of subverting the rule of law 
itself." 
It is against a background of these competing values that our 
Courts approach problems of tax avoidance under section 99. The 
exercise in essence reduces itself to endeavouring to accord to the 
subject the freedom to organise his affairs as he seos fit, yet 
without jeopardising the interests of the fisc. In the estate 
planning context, the striking of this balance becomes a particularly 
delicate question, for to allow the subject too much liberty when 
planning for both these Fiscal burdens is to concede him the best 
of both worlds. 
B. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 99 
The other matter of general background ~hat sets the scene 
for a discussion of the estate planning argument is the judicial 
perception of the place of section 99 in the scheme of the Income 
Tax Act. The decision in l''lcKa): is one of the leading cases in 
point, where the Court of Appeal was called upon to examine the 
relationship between sections 96 and 99. · The particular issue 
before the Court was whether an assignment of income for a term 
longer than "the prescribed period".( and hence deemed to no 
longer be income .of the assignor) may yet by an application of 
section 99 become income assessable to the assignor? The Court 
unanimously ansuered this question in the affirmative, the view 
of their Honour's being most clearly expressed in Speight J's 
observation that -
1 in Rans·orn v Hi.9..9..~ at p.949 
5. 
"I agree with the Presid1rnt that if the ass.i.gr:iment 
is not within section 96 tho matter is at large and 
falls for decision on the same principles as any 
other arrangement which is teste9 against section 99. 111 
It would seem then that our Courts are willing to accord a 
wide potential to section 99, not being prepared to read in the 
limitation that it is subject to the other provisions of the Act. 
It may be added that in Wisheart, the other important case on this 
point, the Court of Appeal applied th0 same reasoning in relation 
to the general deductions section.
2 
However the subsequent 
remarks by the Privy Coun ci 1 in E uro p,i!_, ( No •.?.l 1..1ou ld seem to cast 
doubt on the position taken by the Court in WishGart. This 
conflict is more fully discussed at Part IV B, below. 
C, 
1 • 
THE ESTATE PLAN NIN G ARGUMENT 
Introdu ctio n 
The genesis of ~uch of our law on section 99 is traceable 
to the landmark decision of the Privy Council in Newton. The 
Board there undertook a thorough review of the law that had 
developed under the Australian section 260, and then went on to 
state the principlos to be applied under the section; the 
quintessence of which was that -
1 
2 
"In order to bring the arrangement within the section 
you must be able to predicate - by looking at the 
overt acts by which it was implemented - that it was 
implemented in that particular way so as to avoid tax. 
If you cannot so predicate, but have to acknolwedge 
that the transactions are capable of explanation by 
reference to ordinary business or family dealing, 
without necessarily being labelled as a means to avoid 
tax, then the arrangement does rot come within the 
section. 11 3 
at page 604 
being section 104 
3 at age 7G4. The refinements that were sub"equently added 
to t.he principles established in Nm.1i.c.?Jl wore sumrnarived by 
our Court o f App a al in .A s h-1::2.!l, a t J1 age 3 2 fl • 
) 
6. 
This predication test marks out the correct approach to 
be followed in an administration of the section, and which our 
Courts have found to comprise two asp~cts. The first is 
essentially an evidentiary ono, and delineates the proper subject 
matter to be scrutinised in order that the test may be discharged. 
The second aspect is the substantive one, as to whether an 
examination of the appropriate material discloses a transaction 
of the type within the ambit or the section. The estate planning 
argument in relation to both these aspects has attracted some 
judicial commentary, so this Part of the paper naturally divides 
itself into a discussion of these two matters. That will leave 
as the remaining substantive matter to consider, the question of 
the potential range of application that section 99 bears in the 
estate planning context. 
The case of As~.t.!1!l provides the appropriate starting point 
under this hoad. The facts here were that a firm of accountants, 
upon a change of partners, rearrangod their practice so that the 
commission earned from hire purchase agreements actioned in their 
office came to be income of tho family trusts of tho firm's 
principals. One of the prime movers of the arrangement testified 
that the reorganisation was inspired by the desire to secure for 
the respective families a source of income in the event of the 
demise of that partner. 
Wilson J. at first instance was prepared to accept this 
modified form of the estate planning argument, which in his 
Honaur's view showed the matter to be "a very prudent and 
1 reasonable arrangement." So the arrangement was held to boa 
case of ordinary family dealing. The Court of Appeal however 
was not inclined to such a benevolent construction of the facts, 
finding t·he arrangement "highly artificial". 2 Their Honours' 
went on to hold that the evidence explaining why tho arrangement 
1 at page 310 
2 at pago_ 328 
7. 
was adopted was irrelevant, fo r this· merely disclosed what the 
taxpayor's motive was. And yet motive, on authority of !Jewton, 
is an irrelevant consideration. This reasoning the Privy Council 
endorsed, thoir Lordships holding that the problem of 
ascertaining an arrangement's purpose or effect must be approached 
on the basis that -
"If an arrangement has a particular purpose, then 
that will be its intended offset. If it ha s a 
particular effect, then that will be its pu rpos e 
and o ral eviden ce to shc)l.f that it has a difforent 
purpo se or different effect to that which is shown 
by the arrangement itself is irrel evant to the 
det erminatio n of the question whether the arrangement 
has or purports to have t he purpo se or effect of in 
any way altering the incidence of income tax or 
relieving any person from his liability to pay 
income tax. 11 1 
It followed, as their Lordships went on to emphasiss, that 
the material purpose or effect could be determined "only" by 
reference to the arrangement itsolf and not by reference to the 
2 parties subsequent conduct. The Board's firmness in this 
respe"t contrasts with the approach heretofore taken in th e 
authorities, where no 6 eh strict limitc!:ion had been placed on 
the range of material that may be reviewed, In McKcl.'i. for 
3 example, the Court took into account as "background" two 
1 earlier, similar transactions as materially assisting in indicating _ .. / 
the purpose or effect of the transaction presently under review. 
Moreover and particularly in the estate planning context, it can 
be im a gin e d that this insistence on examining only the arrnngement 
itself may lead to harsh results. There is perhaps no better 
way to demonstrate sincerity to the estate planning purpose 
4 
than to subsequently act in fulfillment of it. Yet it would 
hardly be sensible or fair not to give due weight to subsequent 
history in these circumstances. However as to the other relevant 
point taken by the Board - of equating the estate planning 
1 at page 722 
2 at page 722 
3 at p age 590 
4 
it will b e seen that in one case lalor e vents influenced a 
Court's conclusion.· Soe at page 1 2 below. Th e problems 
inh eror1t in lhe aprroach mandated by Lhu Board are discussed 
at pages 9- 10 bolow. 
8. 
argument with the irrl:fuvant matter of motive - it would seem 
that this reasoning is not of wide import. for it is established 
that when the argument is adduced fro~ the correct context, it 
may yot be vindicated. 
be considered. 
This is evident from the next case to 
In Lo?.df!L. the taxpayer. had for several years carriDd on in 
his own behalf a successful earthmoving contractors business. 
But now, determined to reorganise his affairs, the taxpayer first 
established a family trust and incorporated a company (the 
shareholding in which was held by two family trusts, each of 
which benefited the family of the taxpayer and that of his 
financial adviser). Tho taxpayor next sold most of his plant 
and equipment to the fam ily trust and the rest to the company. 
~ In each caso, the purchase price was interest-free and repayable 
on demand. The family trust then bailed its assets to the 
company, who then employed the taxpayer to utilise them in the 
same enterprise that he had· prev iou sly conducted. Mr Justice 
Cooke found, for business and familial reasons, that the 
tuxr a yer would have adopted this "wholesale reorganisation"
1 
of his affairs regar dloss of the t.axa tion advan t.ag G s obtain od . 2 
Th erofora , his Honour concluded, a sole or principal purpose of 
the nrrangDment was not to escape liability to income tax and 
thus the section did not apply. 
Mr Justice Cooke f ound himself able to introducG the 
estate planning argument so as to entortain the taxpayer's 
contention based upon it by the means that -
1 at 
2 at 
3 at 
"The documents themselves ..Q.2.:lu:rall~. S.Y..,g,.9£,tl that 
the principal purposes were the twin advantages 
of incorporation and.of providing some capital 
and income security for members of the objector's 
fa mily by permaqently transferring assets for 
th eir bensfil."~ · 
page 479 
pago 477 
pag e 447, emphasis added 
( I 
_./ 
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from that premise, it was but a short step to conclude that -
"From the documents it may be inferred that 
estate duty and tax savings may well haveeach 
beeFl included in the purposes of the 
·arrangement. 11 1 
The reasoning applied by Mr Justice Cooke may be stated to 
be that lhe estate planning argument may be relied upon when it 
speaks from the terms of the arrangement, for the argument will 
thus demonstrate what the material purpose or effect of the 
arrangement was. Nor will oral testimony in support of the 
argument be completely ignored, because it may "fortify 112 the 
conclusion reached by a scrutiny of the arrangement itself. 
However, his Honour's view contrasts with the viow taken by the 
Privy Council in Ashton, wh0re testimony of a similar nature 
was excluded on the ground that it was within the irrelovant 
category of "motive". On this state of the aulhori ties, some 
criticisms readily come to ~ind. 
Firstly, there is the failure to elucidate the nation of 
"motive" in order that it rnay be distinguished from the concept 
of "purpose". It is for example difficult to g_rasp the reasoning 
that holds that to provide some ''capital and income for members 
of the objector's family 113 is a matter of purpose, whilst the 
fulfillrnent of the "wish to provide for the welfare of their 
families 114 is a case of mot·ve. Secondly, the suspicion lingers 
that, at least ir, the type of situation dealt with by Mr Justice 
Cooke, the Court is doing a little more than using the extraneous 
evidence lo "fortify" a conclusion reached by an examination of 
the arrangement itself. Here the estate planning argument 
is only implicitly sugges~ed by the terms of the arrangement, so 
it ib difficult to see how a Court can accurately surmise that this 
was lhe relevant purpose or effect without actually embracing 
the independent evidence which explains that that was the case. 
1 at 1177s page 
2 at 477 page 
3 Loader at 477 rage 
t. 
Ashton at 327, in the Court of Appeal pago 
1 0 • 
Thirdlys it is perhaps too subjective an approach to hold that 
11 only 11 the arrangement itself be examined by the Court. It 
has just been noted that the estato pJanning argument will often 
only be impliedly suggested upon a scrutiny of the arrangement. 
This gives rise to the danger that on the same set of facts, 
different Courts may come to the opposite conclusions because 
to one Court the argument may not speak forecefully enough from 
the arrangement itself. 1 For each of these reasons, it may be 
expected that the question of the precise relevance of evidence 
extraneous to tha arrangement itself will som8time receive 
further judi cial scrutiny. Meantimes the common sense approach 
foll owed by Mr Justice Cooke may be acknouledged - that where the 
estate planning argument speaks from the arrangement itself, 
this will transform the taxpayer's erstwhile "motive" into a 
"purpose or effect" of the arrangement. 
3. It10 Vier.its of the Estate P),_qDn ing Argument 
Once the estate planning argument has be0n adduced from the 
proper source, the task remaining is to convince the Court of the 
cogency of the argum·on t . In terms of tho predi eat ion test, 2 
the estate planning argument was made under the ~spect of contending 
that the arrangement was but an instance of "an or.dinary frnnily 
dealing without necessarily being labelled as a means to avoid 
3 tax." Upon application of the predication test, no dispute 
would arise in the case where the estate planning argument is 
' found to amount to the arrangements only purpose or effect. 
However in the situation where it may also be inferred that the 
desire to avoid income tax was one of the purposes of the 
arrangement too, original questions arise. In this situation, 
1 as indeed occurred in the Ash..t.£!2 proceedings, as between the 
fir st two Courts. 
2 cited at pnge 5 ubove. 
3 Newton at pago 764. The position obtaining under the new section 
Ts-slat8d al page 14 below. 
1 1 • 
the balancing of the competing values spoken 6f earlior 1 -
betwe e n the sovereignty of the individual and the need to 
safeguard the i11terosts of the fisc - js thrown into sh~rp relief 
and thus ·the Court i s called upon to determine wh i eh value shall 
prevail. Precisely this situation arose in the recent case of 
Tayle~, . which decision may now be referred to so as to elicit hotJ 
the judicial mind perceives of the force of the estate ~anning 
argument. 
In Ja.¥}.~ , the transactions under review concerned, like 
lli..Q,21:., a thorough-going exercise in estate planning, carried out 
by tlJo brothers in relation to each of their farming enterprises. 2 
The essence of the schemo was to creat8 and utilise the media 
of a unit partnerships in which the t aA payer and a recently 
( • fo rmed f am ily trust joined to c ar ry on the farming business. 
The capital of the partnership, divided into th ree classes, 
comprised a total of 50,600 u11its, of which the taxpayer hold all 
but ·2, 000. 3 The actual fatm property, although it remained 
regi ste red in his name, was declared to be held in trust for the 
benofit of the partnership, which was declared to be for a period 
of 23 years unless sooner det ermi ned, 4 The taxpayer then 
proceeded to gift $2,000 and bail his lives tock a11d equipme nt to 
the f ami ly trust, which then comprised the trust's contribution 
• to tho par. tno r eh i p. It oriy remained to employ the taxpayer as 
a salaried manager of the farming enterpriso. By these means, 
th e scheme rather artfully comprised all the es~ential ingredients 
of a desirable estate pl a n. Th e t _a xpayer had a secure and 
1 
2 
at pages 3~4 abo ve 
the plans in both cases wero identical apart from minor 
adju stments to suit the indiv idua l c~se. So reference 
ta on e pl a n may for convenience be taken as also encompa8sing 
reference to tho oth ur . 
3 his 100 A units gave him ult imate control of th e partnorship, 
whil.nt his ti B,500 8 units (wh ich figu ro represented the equity 
he had field in th e far m) secured the right to a 5~t fixed 
Li 
cu~ulntivo preferontial dividend. The units held by the f amily 
t r u :d, en n b l o d i t to en j o y t I w s u r p l u s i n come D n d re c o i v e t h 8 
surplus capital after repc.yment cif all oth01· units on a winding ·ur. 
whict1 Uio Lnxpayer, with thu spec ifi ed proportions of unit t, uldings, 
coulci 1i~1\!e achieved at an y time. 
12. 
hopefully adequate source of income,
1 yat with his equity in the 
venture frozen in such a way that it could be readily diminished 
by a progressive gifting programme. ,Unfortunately for the 
taxpayor~ the scheme was not viewed in the ensuing proceedings 
in such a kindly light. 
The Taxation Board of Review was unimpressed with counsel's 
conte11tion that this admittedly novel scheme bore all the hallmarks 
of a traditional estate plan and so ought to be treated as such. 
To the contrary, the Board of Review thought that the scheme was 
a ·"highly artifical structure 112 imposed on this farming venture, 
making no practical difference in the manner of the way the farm 
was operated. Secondlyt the Board of Review was inclined to 
doubt the taxpayer's sincerity to the avowed purpose, for the 
Members noted that not only was the taxpayer largely ignorant of 
3 the "mechanics" of the sch0me, but also no change in the unit 
holding had occurred in the succeeding nine yoars. It was for 
thete two reasons that the Board of Review concluded that the 
section applied. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr Justice Jeffries agreed 
i..iith that conclusion. The principal feature of- the plan which 
persuaded his Honour to this view was the use of the 5%cum. pref. 
dividend. Jeffries J. thought that this was "an artificial 
device so that a superflow of income was received by the trust. 114 
Hence it could "be predicated that the manner in which the scheme 
was implemented was to avoid tax, at least as one central purpose." 
For much the same reason, Jeffries ·J. then went on to hold that 
this ackno1.iledg0d exercisE! in estate planning could not be 
acceptod as a matter of ordinary family dealing . The essence 
of his Honour's reasoning ·was to start from the premise that -
1 from his salary, the bailment agreement, and the 5% cum. 
pref dividend. 
2 at 522 pago 
3 - t 523 page 
4 at 677 page 
• 
1 3. 
"The vagueness of the term ordinary businoss or family 
dealing cannot be usod as a covur for all or any type 
of transaction within a family. 11 1 
With that point made, there will 
dealing where there is merel y some -
only ba an ordinar y famil y 
"elements of gonerosity, risk and eased application 
of current commercial practices • •. • ( but not where 
there is ) abandonmunt of commercial practice , 
apparent mercantile foolishness or marked 
artificiality . 11 2 
With this test in mind, his Honour concludod -
"What persuados me the scheme is caught by the 
section is that both the appollants have passed 
to the partnerships the singlo asset of each 
which is of overwhelming importance as the income 
earning asset, and at the same time accepted, or 
probably themselves fixed, a device to the scheme 
to limit the flow of income in return for the use 
of that asset. 11 3 
It is apparent that in fulfillment of the balancing exorcise 
that the Court was called upon to discharge, a position in favour 
of protecting the interests of t he Revenue was adopted. for the 
stand taken by the Co urt was that whilst it mny perhaps be a 
matter of ordinary family dealing to reorganise one ' s affairs in 
f u l f i llment o f an estate plan , this may not be achieved without 
( J violating section 99 if an income tax saving dovice is expressly 
/ 
embodied as part of that rearrangement . It may be expected 
t ha t much the same position will continue to prevai l under the 
present section. Subsection ( 2 )( a) applies the section to t he 
case ~ere the ( onl y) purpose or e f fect of the ~rrangement is 
t ax avoidance . Subsection ( 2 )( b ) catches the arrangemen t that 
has at least two purposes or effects - one of which is tax 
avoidance - regardless of whether one of t hose purposes o r o f fect& 
1 at 678 page 
2 at 678 page 
3 at 678 page 
• 
14. 
is a matter of ordinary family dealing. Thus th~ position 
established by s~bsection (2) is that where the estate plan ( as 
a matter of ordinary fa mi ly dealing) ,is the .Q.IJl.y purpose or 
effect, the se·ction uill not apply. Whereas, if th at ostate 
plan as a matter of ordinary family dealing be a purposo or 
effect that co-oxists along with the more than "merely incidental" 
purpose or effect of tax avoidance, paragraph (b) applies the 
section. In this regard, the position now coincides with what 
was said to be in one of the earliest cases on the section. 1 
In Elmi,_ger, Woodt,ouse J. had stated the proposition that -
"it is my opinion that the family or business dealings 
will be caugt,t by section 99 despite their characterisation 
as sucll, if there is associated with thorn the additional 
purpose or effect of tax relief (in the sense contemplated 
by the section) pursued as a goal in itself and not 
2 arising as a natural incident of some other purpose." 
In terms of that test, Tayles may be cited as authority for 
the proposition that relief from tax will be regarded as "pursued 
as a goal in itself" in tho case where a tax saving feature is 
express) y embodied as some part of the arrangement itself. for· 
of the arrangement reviewed in that case, the use of the 5% cum. 
pref. dividend ineluctably suggests the desire to diminist1 the tax 
burden by limiting income. Load_§L by way of contrast may be cited 
as an example of where - there being no tax saving foature an overt 
part of the arrangernen t - t .he avoidance of tax was "a natural 
incident of some other purpose" because the estate plan would 
have been adopted regardless of its income tax advantages . As 
to the more factual aspect as to whether any particular arrangement 
is within either li mb of the test formulated by Woodhouse J., this 
will be taken up and more fully considered on the di scussion of 
onus of proof, at Part IV A, below . ~1eantimB, the outstanding 
issue ·or principle - being the potentia] scope of soction 99 in 
tho estate planning context - remains tu be referred to. 
1 
2 
his Honour there wcJs following Newt.9.12 and the "one purpose" test. 
Howevor in r~s'l.9--!:.D. the requisite puri")ose test was modified to a 
"sole or prin c ipal purpose"; only to be changed back to a 11 0110 
puqrnse" test by As ht on; to bu al t e rcd to a "main or one of the 
main purposes" in Europa (No.2) 
at page 694 
1 5. 
4. The Scc,,ee o[ Section 99 in the Estate Planning ContB2Si 
Once again the case of Tayles is an important precedent, 
becauso the decision of Mr Justice Jeffries on the facts of that 
case ·can be seen to raise original questions as to the possible 
limits to the rango of section 99; a vital question in the estate 
planning context. The suggestion has been made that the decision 
in~-~ "represents a considerable extension of the ambit of the 
section" • 1 This view in based on tho contention that, for an 
arrangement to escape application of section 99, "the Courts have 
required the trusts to gain ~.Q. endudng bene(it;_. 112 It is pointed 
out that most of the cases, from El rn i9e ~ , MangiQ and Udy through 
to Gerard and AshtoQ, are characterised by ''sho r t term transfers of 
high income producing assets or quickly wasting assets. 113 
Ta_yJ.e_~ on the other hand is said to be different, becauso the farm 
would eventually pass to the taxpayer's family. Ergo an "enduring 
benefit" had been obtained. On this analysis, it may be observed, 
the decision in Ja,.xl~ can be seen to strike at one of the 
essent.i.al ch a racteristic"' of any_ estate plan and hold that 
satisfaction of this element was not onough to defeat an application 
of section. Inherent in any estate plan, regardloss of form, 
is that some ''enduring bonefit" move tothe disponor's family. 
Hence, although Taylcs occurred in the context of a reorganisation 
) of an entrepreneurial activity, does Mr Harley's analysis suggest 
that the case has wider ramifications for areas outside its 
particular context? The answer to this question is plainly a 
matter of vital concern to estate planners. 
Before testing this contention by means of eliciting from the 
jurispruder1ce the pivotal feature which will move the judicial 
mind to apply the section, some comments may first be made on the 
coherence of the argument itself. In the first instance, it is 
unfortunate that the commentator did not intimate pre~isely what 
he had in mind when speaking or the notion of an ''enduring benefit". 
1 Harley at 1 /~ 1 page 
2 at 143 p a ge 
3 2t 11~ 3 page 
16. 
Does it connote merely the right to a source of income or something 
more in the form of the acquisition of a permanent asset or an 
interest therein? In .k.9,adg for exarpJ.e, whilst the family trust 
obtained· equity in the new family company, its source of income 
was dependant upon the continued personal exertions of the taxpayer. 
Which is exactly the situation that prevails in the classic paddock 
situation. Only in the Farmar case was the arrangement upheld, 
yet it 1..1ould be difficult to hold that the "enduring benefit" in 
the form of a sourcu of income was different in kind in the two 
situations. 
A second problem is encountered when it is maintained that 
application of the section depends upon the r1ature of the assets 
transferred. Such a view would not for example sustain the 
difforent results that were reached in the similar cases of Grierson 
and L!.,ishoaz:.i. [ach case concerned the endeavour by an engineering 
and legal firm respectively to utili8e a sorvice company to provide 
intbr alia office equipmen~ to the respective practices. Yet 
in Grierson the Court upheld the arrangement. 1 
Thirdly it may ·be asked whore tho Courts have expressly 
11 r e q u i r 0 d II an " on du r i n g be n e f i t " to p a s s i 11 o r d G ·r to d e f e a t 
invocation of the section? There is for example only some olden 
dicta by the High Court of Australia, 2 that the section could not 
invalidate an actual disposition of income-producing property, 
made to reduce the burden of taxation. The nearest our Court of 
Appeal has come to making the stipulation argued for is to merely 
stato that the section could not avoid ''transactions consisting 
simply of absolute present gifts of capital. 113 Perhaps the 
position closest to requiring an "enduring benefit" is that taken 
by the Inland Revenue Department itself. In "Incidence of 
Taxation" for example, 4 where the Department sets out the guidelines 
1 for reasons explained at page 38 below 
3 f11cKQ..i., at page 601 
4 particularly at pages 6 to 12 
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followed in administering the section, tho omphasis for an 
unimpeachable arran90ment is upon those transactions that croate real 
and enduring obligations and benefit~ and which involve permanent 
transfers without reservations or reversions. In short "an 
enduring benefit". However it is apparent that the Courts 
. do not analyse problems arising under the section on the basis or 
the view argued for by Mr Harley or indeed that taken by the 
Department itself. 
The case law suggests that the fundamental basis upon which 
application proceeds is that overriding importance is to be attached 
to tho impact - or lack thereof - that the arrangement has on 
the affairs of the taxpayer. Right from the earliest cases, the 
Court found it significant that ''there was no change in the practiol 
operation of the partnership business'' or that "the appellants 
continued their business to all intents and purposes as before. 111 
Instead, the only change was found to be an "accounting or 
procedura1 112 ons that enabl'ed income to bo 'hivad off"; "siphoned 
off 114 or"diverted 11 •
5 
Hence the approach taken in the authorities 
is that when a survey of the particular facts disclosos that the 
11 s conorni c incidence" 6 of the di spaner' s tax bu r_den is all that 
has been affected by the arrangement, then the Court will move 
to invoke section 99 - unless the taxpayer is able to adduce sound 
reasons which dernonstrato that the arrangement was either necessary 
or desirable. 7 
1 
2 
f)rnigor_ at pages 179 ( North P.) and 188 (McCarthy J.) respect.ively. 
f o r r o i t e r a t i on o f t h e s am e no t.i. on , see for s x amp l e f-lJ a r x a t pa g e s 
1 9 2 an d 2 1 3 , .~£.'l a t pa g e 1 7 , f~ .. Lcil..ti Mo t q_,t.~ a t pa g e s 5 1 - 5 2 , We 11 s at 
pa g e 1 Lt 4 , ~1 a Q.£. i n 8 t pa g El 2 3 4 , U i s h ea r t a l pa g e 3 2 1 , f'1c O on a l d a t 
page 133, and Halliweli at page 2 
.f:la_i:~ at page 213, per McCarthy J. 
3 QQ,i_ at page 17 
4 
.B,idlo~, M~:§. at 52 page 
5 
0 1 l< a 11n Construction at 57 ..,.. ___ --- - page 
6 
l'.19..'29.Dl 3 t. 596 page 
7 as the taxpayer wa~ ablo to do in G.iorson for example, for the 
reasons noted at pago 38 below. 
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Plainly thi~ analysis does nat ·postulate th& absenco of an 
''enduring benefit" as the pivotal notion upon which application 
of the soction proceeds. Rather it ~sin the notion that tho 
arrangem ent merely alters the disponer's tax burden without any 
notice able change in the conduct of his affairs that the Courts 
find an unacceptable degree of artificiality in the impugned 
arrangement. Inexorably then, the Court moves to draw the 
i n fer en c e that t h e pro s c r i bed p u r po so o r ef f e c t u as i n mi n d • I f 
this line of reasoning be th e fundam enta l basis_ upon which the 
Courts move to apply the section, th en to attach importance to 
tho noti on of "enduring benefit" as argue d for by Mr Harle y (and 
indeed followed by the Department its8l f) is to misconceive the 
potential scope of the section. Moreover, it may furthe r be pointed 
out that the analysis suggested by the authorities does not mean, 
1 as some commenta tors have suggested, that the Courts "read down" 
the word "effect" in the phrase "purpo se or effect", for quite 
clear ly the view just argued for holds that much importance is 
a so attached to this aspect. It only re ma ins to add that this 
analysis would not support the view that Tayle s "represents a 
considerable extension of the ambit of the section•• 2 novelty of 
3 the particular circumstances excepted, 
However to discount the importance of "an enduring benefit" 
~ is not to make a case for despair amongst estate planners . It 
may bo observed that the estate planning argument has arisen in 
the context of a reorganisation of a taxpayer's entrepreneurial 
activity. In this type of situation, the Court may naturally 
incline to be suspicious of the argument, for the commercial 
context may well suggest that the de sire to reduce income tax could 
have also been a strong motivating ~orce. 4 Beyond that type of 
situation, where fo r example a person proceeds to divest himself of his 
·1 
Dalton al page 104, Richard so n at page 565 
2 as noted at page 15 above 
3 Jndeed, it uas pointed out at page 12 above, that on e of the 
roasons_ expressly relied on by one of' the courts in the Tayle_~ 
proceedings was th e _vie1.1 ju st argued for 
4 for re asons that ;re more fully developed at Part IV A, below 
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equity, is a shndow area; one not touched on in depth by any wide-
ranging judicial discus sion. It has already boen noted 1 that our 
Court of Appeal has stated in rrnssing, that to "simply" dispose of 
property is not within the subject matter dealt with by the section. 
That view may be endors ed, on the ba s is of the predication test that 
is administered under the section. To "simply" dispose of property 
would not enable it to be predicate d that the transaction was 
"implem e nted in that particul ar way so as to avoid tnx. 112 Some 
authority in support of this view may be drawn from the judgment 
of lJild C.J. in lJistl£.art, where h.is Honour applied the predication 
test 3 to meet the contention that to dispo se of the insurance 
agency was an ordinary f am ily dealing. 4 This suggests that th0 
converse conclusion would be open in the more innocent situation 
presently in mind. It is on th is line of reasoning that it may ue 
speculated that if the Department should seok lo reverse its present 
policy and apply the section to this shadow area, it would probably 
be un suc cessful. 
The discu ss ion of our juri sprude nce has taken us to the point 
of perceivi ng that section 99 is on its face a f ar-reaching 
provi sion. The only limitation that it would seem to be subject 
to is an administrative one whereby the section is only applied in a 
comme rcia l ~antcxt where a pu rpose or eff et of tax avoidance is 
thought by the Revenue to be present. Ju st what a taxpayer must 
do in this situation to defeat invocat·on of the section is a 
matlor taken up at Part IV A below. At this juncture, the appropriate 
course is to turn to the Australian situation in order that it may 
be illustrated the disparate approach there takon,despite the 
close similarity between the two section s . 
1 at page 16 above 
2 Ne~ton at page 76~ 
3 
ti 
al page 442 
all.hough his llonour was ov er ruled on appeal on th e ground that 
an insurance agency L'DS not an asset thal could bo "tran::,furred", 
this does no t detract from the rcasaning App icd by the Cl1icf 
Justice. 
20. 
PART III AUSTRALIA 
A. THE CONCEPTUAL SCOPE Of SECTION 260 
.In any endeavour to apply section 260 of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936-1977, the f0doral Commissioner of Taxation 
faces the task of satisfying two conceptual limitations that the 
section is subject to. One of these limitations has been found 
to be inherent in the terms of the section itself, whilst the 
other is said to flow from the judicial perception of the place 
that the section occupies in the scheme of the Act. These 
restrictions are of cour;>e independant of the further consideration 
as to whether the particular fact situation under review is of the 
type nominally within the terms of the section as it has been 
interpreted in the cases, 1 Hence the discussion in this Part 
of the paper broadly divides itself into an examination of these 
three matters. 
1 • The Annj_hj];ating C~racter of Section 260 
The High Court in Clarke 2 first drew attention to the paint 
that ssction 260 merel y "annihilates", for income tax purposes, 
every arrangement that purports to avoid liability to income tax. 
The significance of this limitation lies in the point that, even 
if the section may bo applied to such an arrangement and the 
matters thereby voided are disregarded, an appropriate set of 
facts must still remain which support the Commissioner's 
assessment. Otherwise the assessment must fall ber.ause the 
section does not authorise the assumption of hypothetical facts. 3 
This point may be illustrated by reference to what is one of the 
mast controversial cases decided under section 260, being the 
1 the approach taken in this jurisdiction is ta also apply the 
2 
3 
principles laid down in Newton, for a lucid discussion of 
thoir interpretation by t.t1eAustralian courts, see Dalton; 
especially at pages 96 - 109. 
at pa;fe 127 
Spry at page 90 
, 
I 
\ 
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decision of the Fu11· High Court in Cecil Bros. 1 The taxpayer 
there was footweir merchant, whoso impugned arrangement was to 
simply interpose a family trust between itself and its usual 
' wholesale outlet. By this means, the taxpayer paid $39 ,554 
more for its trading stock than if it had dealt directly with the 
wholesaler. Perhaps not unnaturally, the Commissioner sought 
to reduce by that amount the taxpayer's claim for a deduction on 
account of purchases of trading stock. The view taken by the 
Full High Court as to the problems attendant upon annihilation 
was expressed by Menzies J. in the following terms -
11 1 do not think that section (260) authorises 
the Commissioner to substitute a different price 
for that actually paid in accordance with those 
(t rading stock) contracts. Indeed section 260 
does not authorise the Commissioner to do 
anything; it avoids as against the Commissioner 
arrangements, etc., as specified and so leaves 
him to assoss taxable income and tax on the facts 
as they appear ~hen the avoidad arrangements, 
etc., are disregarded. Here it is not revealed 
that the taxpayer company's real outgoings for 
its supplies were $39 ,554 less than it paid or 
that the additional $ 39,554 was not paid or was 
a gift to ( the family company). To arrive at 
any such conclusion would, I think be an 
2 unauthoris ed reconstruction of what occurred ..... " 
The significance of this limitation of the section will vary 
from case to case, yet it does indicate that there is some truth 
in the observation by Mr Justice Mahoney, that section 260 
"operates after the manner of a blurit axe 11 • 3 
1 
2 
3 
that coRtroversy, arising on another aspect of the case, is 
expanded upon at Pert IV B, below. 
at page 441 
J.:.9ldern & Wilson at page 157, a case where al though the section 
appl ied, the Commissior1er ' s asse ssment f8ilad because of 
annihilation proble ms . 
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2. The Re~a tionship to Other Se c tions of the Act 
The nature of the second limitation was summed up by Sir Garfield 
Barwick when his Honour observed -
"there will be no relevant alt e ration of the 
incidence of tax if the transaction being the 
actual transaction between the parties, conforms 
to and satisfies a provi s ion of the Act even if 
it has taken the form in which it was entered 
into by the parties in order to obtain the 
benefit of that prov i sion of the Act. 11 1 
The principle exprc~sed by his Honour is ccmpsndiously known 
as "the choice doctrine", whose origin is us ually traced back to 
another controv e rsial decision of the High Court; being tho case 
of W. P. J< e i ghe ry Pty L t ,d~ The reasoning under 1 y ing th a doctr ins 
may be found in the following obs e rvation of Gibbs J., who recently 
had occasion to ma ke some gen e ral co mm ents about the office of 
section 260. Thus his Honour wrote -
"the presence of section 260 makes it impossible 
to place up on other provision s of the Act a 
qualifi c ation which they do not express, for the 
purpose of inhibiting tax avoidance. In other 
words it is not permissible to make an implication 
which does wh a t section 260 fails to do in 
preventing the avoidance of tax. If it is 
suggested that a taxpayer has engaged in a 
device to s e cure a fiscal adv ant a ge, and the 
relev ant provisions of the Act do not expressly 
deal with the matter, the case depend s entirely 
on section 260. 11 3 
1 Mullen s·at page 509 
2 but see Dalton at page 113 for the suggestion that germination 
of the doctrine may be traced ba ck further, to the dicta 
expres se d in Pu r ce ll, and wh ic h wa s allu ded to a t r age 16 ab ov e . 
' • 
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The jurisprudence subseque11t to the propoundrnent of the choice 
doctrine in Keighe!..Y, has been marked by a gradual extension of the 
parameters of that doctrine. Althoug.h this is not to say that 
all s~bssquent developments have been entirely in the direction of 
an expansion of the doctrine. Mr Justice Mahoney for example 
has developed the exception that the Act offers no relevant 
"choice" in respect of its "machinery" provisions. 1 Be this 
as it may, the latest word from the High Court is to not only 
reaffirm the doctrine 9 but also to take it to its ultimate 
logical conclusion. Thus in Slutzkin, Aickin J. observed 
"To adopt a course which produces a result outside 
the 8cope of the Act is not to alter the incidence 
of tax, or to defeat any liability to tax or to 
prevent the operation of the Act, notwithstanding 
that such n course is adopted with full knowledge 
of the provisions of the Act and with a conscious 
intention that the proceeds should not fall 
within the operation of the Act. 11 2 
It would seem then that the Act also offers a "choice" 
whether or not a proposed transaction should be brought within 
the terms of the Act, so that to decline to do so is not to 
violate section 260. The authority of these remarks may perhaps 
be questioned, for not only do they resl uneasily against the 
view of Mr Justice Gibbs just quoted, but also they would seem 
( e ta be opposod to the following comment of Mr Justice Walsh, who, 
also speaking for two other members of the High Court, wrote -
1 
"If a taxpayer makes a decision to arrange matters 
so that income from his property follows one of 
the courses so described and reaches him with the 
character of capital, in my opinion he is not 
thereby exercising a right of choice between 
3 alternatives which the Act lays open to him." 
see ~., parlicu'!arly at page 221 
2 at page 144 
3 f~ Motors, at page 55 
( 
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Ho1JBver, irrespective of this conflict ·of precede nt, it would 
seem that the High Court currently takes a ve ry nar_row view of 
the scope of section 260. 1 It would seem moreover that the 
federal Commissioner now recognises that section 260 is no longer . 
an effective we a pon to defeat measures of tax avoidance and has 
switch e d the battle to another front. Thus the recent passage 
of s e ction 31C, 2 the intended amendment to section 103A(2)(d)(vi) 3 
and th e proposed introduction of measures of tax avoidance 4 
would seem to fo r eshadow a campaign that relies upon legislating 
for specific tax avoidan c e problems rather than utilising the 
all-embracing approach followed under section 260. 
B. THE ESTATE PLANNING ARGUMENT 
Having trac e d through the increasingly narrow conceptual 
range of soction 260, it should perh a ps not be surprising to find 
such a development paralleled by a trend of restrictive 
application in those area s -wh e re nominally at least - the 
section may be applied. This development will become evident 
by an ex amination of the precede nts reviewing income splitting 
arrangements that bear estate planning implications. 
1 • The decision in Millard - - ------ -"'il>llb""'~ 
This case concerned the manoeuvre whereby the taxpayer, a 
registered bookmaker, sold his business to a newly incorporated 
family company. Thereaft e r the taxpayer purported to carry on 
as agent for the company exactly the same business as previously. 
1 see for example the insistence by Barwick C.J., that before 
section 260 can be applied, there must be an antoc e dant 
transa c tion th a t i s ·reca s t into its present form in order to avoid 
tax. Stated in Mu ll e ns at pa ge s SO? and 510. The parallel be tween 
t h i s v i e w and w h- a t h '{s Hon o u r a r g u e d w h en a pp e a r i n g as C o u n s e 1 i n 
Newton has been noted. Soe Gz ell at page 46. 
2 which authoris e s the Co mmissioner to apportion purchases of trading 
stack to re flect its true pri c e whor e the partie s in quostion are 
not de aling at arms-length. In e sse nc e , th e Ce cil Oros. type of 
situa tion. 
3 
to furtl1er rest r ict the ability of an erstwhile priv a te comp a ny 
att a jn i ng "publ i c" st a tus me r e ly f or t ax purposes. In e ss en ce , the 
~Jlb. ~ , C a~ ~ i ll a t y p e o f c i tu a t i on • 
4 0u cige t Sp oo ch 1977-78, at pa go 22. 
• 
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Perhaps because the taxpayer took the unwise course of 
acknowledging that his actuating purpose was to "pay less tax 
and end up with more capital", 1 Taylor J. had little difficulty 
in ho~ding tha£ the section applied. 
2. The deci s ion in l:!.Ql.t~C?.£1.s. 
A similar conclusion was reached in the case of a sale by 
a che mist of a one-half share in his pharmacy business to his 
wife. Much of the judgment of Mr Justice Gibbs is burdened with 
a discussion of the different "purpose" tests of Newt.on and l'J.gn_gin; 
in the course of which his Honour makes out a forceful case for 
adoption of the former sta ndard. In any event though, Gibbs J. 
was satisfied that along with the de sire to avoid death duty, 
the avoidance of income tax was an essential purpose. Ergo tho 
section applied. 3 
These early decisions plainly marked a willingness on the 
part of the Austr a lian Courts to be sympath e tic to the Commissioner's 
endeavours to utilise section 260 to strike down income splitting 
arrangements carried out in a family context. However subsequent 
pretede nts reveal a current of authority pulling in the opposite 
direction, which thereby accords a substantial measure of 
legitimacy to the estate planning argument . 
3. The decision in Peacock 
en&~~#Q 
Here f1 r Ju s t i c e N e t t l e f o r d s.t ting i n t h e Sup rem R Co u r t o f 
Tasmania considered the case of where a registered survoyor 
admitted his wife as a full partner in his practice. However 
it was not until some fourteen years ·later that the Commissioner 
sought to challenge the arrange ment, by assessing, at that point, 
1 
at page 3L12 
2 
mentioned at Fn 1, at page 14 abovo 
3 
see at page 607 
26. 
, 
the income derived from the practice to the husband. In his denial 
of the Commissioner's assessment, the taxpayer acknowledged that 
whilst possible tax savings were in mjnd, nonetheless, the sharing 
of the capital built up through the marriage for the purposes of 
estate duty savings and to ensure spousal independence and 
security were the main actuating reasons. 1 S~ch honesty had 
its reward, for Nattleford J. held that the facts disclosed an 
ordinary dealing without nece ssarily being labelled as a means 
to avoid tax. 2 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this case is the 
broad view his Honour took of the concept of an "ordinary dealing" 
in order to arrive at what might at first blush seem a surprising 
result - that it is not "unusual" for a non-qualified person to 
be a principal in a professional practice. The premise 
underlying his Honour's reasoning was that he regarded the 
taxpayer's enterprise as not merely a professional practice 
involving the exercise of a special technical skill, but rather 
as a "business'' whose range of activities necessarily compr ehended 
more than purely professional work. It was . that reasoning which 
enabled the Court ta justify the otherwise surprising result. 
In this connection,it may be added that much the same view 
enabled his Honour to skirt the point made as to the possible 
illegality of the arrangement. Mr Justice Nettleford 
held, by a literalism, that as the taxpayer's wife in her 
participation of the work of tho firm did not actually hold 
herself out as a surveyor, then equally she did not "practise" 
as one; in terms of the proscription containetj in the relevant 
professional statute.
3 The judgment then makes it reasonably 
clear that the Court was inclined to a liberal view of matters of 
ordinary family dealing, which is to acknowledge the force of 
inter alia the estate planning argument. 
1 
see at pages 678-9 
2 at pages G80-9 
3 see at page 686 
( 
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ThG decision in these two similar cases by the Chief Justice 
of South Au s tralia sitting in that State's Supreme Court may be 
taken as further evidence of this trepd of a tolerant approach. 
Each pass concerned a pharm a cy busin es~ which in Bayly had bsen 
purcha sed by the taxpayer's wife whilst in J ones had been sold by 
the taxpayer to his wife. In both cases, the husband was 
thereafter employed, by his unqualified wife, as a salaried 
manager to conduct the pharmacy business. 1 
In their efforts to deny an application of section 260, the 
taxpayers in both cases were no thing if not resourceful in 
argument. The actuating reasons ware said to be to secure some 
relief fr om the two fiscal burdens, tog e ther with the desire to 
obtain equality of ownership with the ma trimoni a l assets. 2 
Natur a lly this 1 tter aspect rec e ived the most emphasis, and was 
said to spring from the wish to secu r e some measure of the limitation 
of li a bility should .the busin e ss prove unsuccessful (neither 
business was carried on through the media of a company), as well 
as to organise their affairs to reflect the mod0rn notion of a 
marri a ge as a partnership of equ a ls in all respects. In Bal.).y, 
however, Chief Justice Bray did not feel comp elled to make any 
findings on the cogency of the taxpayer's arguments, for his 
Honour thought that the Commis s ioner's assessment entailed some 
notional reconstruction.
3 Hence it fell on th a t ground. 
In Jon e s though no such difficulty prevailed, so the Court 
had to deal squ a rely with the question as to whether the facts showed 
a case of ordinary family dealing. · This . the Cou r t answered in 
the affirmative, despite the series of obstacles to be surmounted 
before that conclusion could be reached. 
1 
it ~ay be not e d that in New Zealand this situation is to some 
extant iegulated by section 97. The essence of that provision is 
to allow only "reasonabl e 11 remuneration or sh a re of profits where 
a relative join s in the conduct of th e t a xp a yer's business. 
Normally the ma teri a l ruling rate is taken as the appropriate 
stand a rd. Jn pract i ce, the section is quite an effective measure 
to counter in come split s in th{s type of situat i on. 
2 
'1, 
s e e .§fil:.1.2.y at page 226 a nd 2.~ at page 232. 
see a t page 227. Es s enti a l] y the point was that "the facts lJhich 
r0ma i11" upon vo i da nc e of th 0 purchase by th o wife wo ul d s till no t 
le a ve th o hu s ba nd a s · own or or the busin e s s in order that the in come 
der ived lh er sf r or.r could ho asses s e d to llim. 
• 
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The first point to arise was the significance sought to be 
attached to the casual, if not suspicious, manner by which the 
sale transaction was implemented. lj.:; transpired 1 that the 
price was satisfied out of the profits of the business - and only 
then upon the imminence of the current proceedings. His Honour 
met the point by holding that the parties seriously ''intended" 
that a sale should be made, so that any irregularity in bringing 
it to fruition could be ignored. 
The second matter dealt with by the Chief justice was the 
question of illegality, as his Honour had found 3 that it was 
illegal for Mrs Jones to acquire and carry on this pharmacy business. 
His Honour met this obstacle by citing4 the principle that income 
dishone stly earned was taxable just the sarne as honest gains 
and then illustrated the point by giving the specious analogy 
5 
that it would be ridiculous to no longer tax income earned by 
a licenced tradesman merely because he had not paid his annual 
licence fee. And secondly, which is perhaps the more telling 
point, Bray C.J. noted that any illegality in the mode of carrying 
on of the business could not be said to converlthe income of the 
wife into that of the husband's. 6 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
The next issue facing the Court was the contrary precedent 
see at page 232 
at page 234 
at page 234 
at this poi.nt, Bray C.J. adopted tho discussion on the subject 
made j n Ba:tl,Y, See at pages 219-220. 
specious bt cause it would only be truly in point if it were 
~ister Bayly who own~d and carried on the business in the 
illegal mannor sugyestsd in the analogy. 
6 at paao 220 
•• 
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of Hollxock, which doalt with
1 
it may be recalled the very similar 
problem of a sale of a one-half interest in a pharmacy business 
by a husband to his wife. To disting~ish th2t prec edent, his 
Honour invok 0d the judgmcnt of th e Privy Council in 
Eurora JN9~£l as now stating the correct law on the point. 
Although Holbo& fallowed the "one purpose" test of Newton, his 
Honour felt that this had been superseded t:J,r the "main or one of the 
main purposes" test of .EL!roea (.No, 2). But curiously enough, 
Bray C.J. did not mention the "one purpose" test reaffirmed in 
Ashton; which might ho.vo had some bearing on tha choice of the 
relevant test to be adopted. 3 Be this as it may, the 
Chi ef Justice went on to find 4 that the main purpose of the 
present transaction was to secure the equalisation of the 
matrimonial assets, with the savings in income tax to be gained 
thereby only a minor and subsidiary purpose and effect. 
The final noteworthy aspect of the judgment concerns the 
expansion by the Chief Justice upon the concept of an ordinary 
fa mily dealing. Of that notion) Bray C.J. observed -
"A redistribution of family assets including a 
family business, as between a husband and wife 
is a normal ordinary, everyday family transaction 
which would not normally attract section 260 
where there is no profession a l element in the 
business. farmers, shopkeepers, factory owners 
do it frequently. 11 5 
It would seem that his Honour was willing to extend the 
opportunity to engage in matrimonial asset sharing exercises 
reg ardless of its vocational context, without considering it 
necessary to make any such refinement as Ncttleford J. did in 
Peacock . In so doing, it would seem that the following warning 
sounded by Menzies J. in Peate will no longer be heeded. There 
1 
see at page 25, above. 
2 seo at page 226 and page 238 
3 
for it would have meant two Privy Council and one High Court 
precodant following a "one purriose" test, as a_ainst the 1 .rrincipal" 
or "main" purpoces tests of £1a!J.9.i!J. and [ur.~p<1 No .2_. !!.£~ and 
.t!.illY?.S-:L<, were ostensibJ y bincJj ng on the Court, whilst f!.angi!J and 
f.!:!.E!1~- ~No_:.?l techn~c lJ. y wore not. 
4 
t 238 a, page 
5 
• 
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his Honour had pointed out -
"What, outside a profession might be regarded as 
an ordinary trans a ct i on may, within a profession 
have an altogether different appearance. 11 1 
So it is readily app ar ent th a t these three later casos 
illustrate that the present trend of authority ·in Australia is 
to elevate exercises in matrimonial asset sh a ring, almost as a 
matter of principle it would seem, into matters of ordinary 
family dealing and therefore beyond the rang e of section 260. 
With the estate planning argument but one facet of such transactions, 
it may be said th a t that argument ha s been judicially acknowledg e d 
as potent enough to materially assist in defeating an application 
of the section. 
5 • 
The use of service trusts or companies in the managGment or 
conduct of an enterprise is not a matter that has to date received 
extensive judicial scrutiny. However it would seem that in the 
meantime, the Federal Co mm ission~r is taking a hard line and is 
refusing to acknowledge their efficacy for tax purposes. 2 The 
issue is currently being litigated, but unfortunately the results 
to hand do not offer a convincing resolution of the matter. 
~ The case in point is the decision of Mr Justice Waddell in 
• 
£..blJJiel!, when sitting in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
The matter that arose for consideration concerned the measures 
taken by a large accountancy firm, ·tho essence of which was to 
establish a unit trust for the purpase of the ~rust then providing 
the various management and administrative services required by the 
firm. The Commissioner denied the partner.ship a deduction for 
all the amounts paid to the trust on account of the provision of 
1 at page 460. Cited with approval by Gibbs J. in Holl~ock, 
at page 607 . 
2 s ee Po s e at pag o 15. 
• 
31. 
those services,
1 
which action mBmbe~s of the firm . challenged. 
The approach taken by Waddell J. was, in essence, to back-in 
to the problem~ The initial prsmise·of his Honour's reasoning 
was to hold
2 
that the decision of Cecil Bro s . governed the present 
facts, then noting
3 
that that decision had be en approved by the 
Privy Council in Euro12 a (No.11. lJh.i.lst this latter observation 
is undoubtedly correct, it is nonBtheless clear from the judgment 
given by the Bo a rd that their Lordships approved of that decision 
in relation to problems arising from the deductions section of the Act. 4 
Henc e few legal scholars would be willing to adduce that approval 
as relevant to any discussion under section 260. That point 
aside, Waddell J. then ma de a lengthy citation from the judgment 
5 
of Menzies J., when his Honour had discuss e d the difficulties 
that arose upon annihilation and which the Commissioner faced in 
endeavouring to support his assessment. Those rema r ks Waddell J. 
turned to apply to the instant facts. Th e y showed,in his 
Honour's vie~,, that the Commissioner's assessment entailed 
notional reconstruction, because it involved substituting the 
firm in the place of the trust in the various service contracts 
that had been made between the firm and the trust. 6 As a final 
comment, his Honour added 7 that in any event, the establishment 
of the unit trust (and the companies used to manage the trust) 
were not, as the Commissioner argued, capable of annihilation 
because a proscribed purpose could not be inferred from their mere 
establishment. Thus his Honour concluded an application of 
section 260 could not be sustained. · 
1 at 346-3Li 7 see pages 
2 at 356 page 
3 at 357 page 
4 
Waddell J. ought instead havo cited Eu r oe a 
at pa g·_e ll 4 be l01..1. 
5 part of · uhich is quoted at page 2, above. 
6 
nt pages 357-358 
7 
at pag e 358 
lNo.22, as mentioned 
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Although not very clearly articulated, Mr Justice Waddall's 
view that the Co~missioner's assessment entailed some reconstruction 
seemed to rest on the ground that the various substitutions his . 
Honour mentioned would then lead to the situation of the firm 
being both parties to the several contracts and thus making, in 
effect, payments to itself. In which case, tho claim for the 
respective deductions could be denied becauso there would have 
been no effective disbursement or outlay. However there was 
another line of reasoning open to the Court if the whole 
transaction had been approached in its chronoJoQical order. 
The initial premise of this reasoning is the point that 
Waddell J. added almost as an afterthought and which concerns 
the ability to annihilate the unit trust and management companies. 
Millard has already been cited 1 as an example where the Court 
denied the existence of a company upon an application of the 
section. Furth ermore, the decisions of the Privy Council in 
Mangin 2 and Ashton 3 may be cited as authority to similarly treat a 
Trusl. Thus contrary to his Honour's view, jt would seem to be a 
proposition firmly entrenched i~ the authorities that section 260 
does authorise the Commissioner to ignare the existence of a 
trust or company when he comes to make his assessment. The 
4 position is usually said to be that upon the avoidance of the 
tru st or company and any agreement that they may have made in 
prosecution of the proscribed purpose, tho status quo ante is 
notionally restored and the Comm·ssioner is entitled to assess on 
the basis of the position that obtained prior to the making of the 
(now void ed ) arrangement. 5 It is manifest that the essence of 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
at page 24 abovo 
see at page 597 
see at page 724 
see the summary given by Bray C.J. in Baylx at page 227 
a simil a r situati~n arose in LJj sho~r t ir1 relation to the employment 
o f o f f i c e s ta f f • A s t h 0 a g r e. e rn e n t u ri d en· uh i c h t h o 1 a w f i r m 
p u r po r t e ci to pa y far t h o s ta f f p r a v j c! G d b y t h o f, c r v i c e c or pan y w a s 
voids the firm lost tho right to claim a deduction for the 
expenditure on account thoroof. Seo North P. at page 322 and 
Turner J. at pag e 331 
• 
.I 
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this line of reasoning is to merely strike down without any 
concomrnitant raconstruction and thus provides reason for holding 
that the Commissioner's assessment in. Philljos was yet sustainable. 
It is ta be hoped that when the Federal Court hears the appeal 
lodged in these proceedings, a mare convincing exposition of the 
problem is offered. 
6. Conclusion 
The ability of this jurisdiction's all-embracing anti-avoidance 
provision to deny fisr.Al efficacy to any estate plan is rostrictad 
by two considerations. Firstly there are the two conceptual 
limitations that the provision is subject toj both of which are 
illustrated by the procoedings in Cor.il Bros. 1 It may be added 
though that the extension by PhilU.fil of the reconstruction 
limitation to the service trust type of situation is not of 
compelling authority, so that further judicial scrutiny of this 
aspect may be expected. Secondly and perhaps most importantly, 
is the current judicial willingness to hold that the exercises in 
matrimonial asset sharing - whicl, expressly encompass the estate 
planning argument - are matters of ordinary family dealing and 
hence ,nay be undertaken without fear of violating section 260. 
This willingness may be evidenced by the position that the 
authorities postulate - that it is not now "unusual" for a 
professionally qualified taxpayer to be either a partner with or 
in the employ of his unqualified spouse in the pursuit of his 
professional calling. Thus the power of the estate planning 
argumant has in this jurisdiction been judicially acknowledged. 
1 
the aspect relating lo the choice doctrine is referred to at 
Part IV 8 balOl .. 1, 
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PART IV ARGUMENTS DENYING AN APPLICATION O( SECTION 99 
The concept underlying the administration of section 99 
i s t ha t the pro v i s i on i s s a id to b e ,; s e 1 f - e x e c u t i n g " 
1 
and no t 
dependant upon the exercise of a discretion by the Commissioner. 
Its application to an arrangement of the type within its terms 
2 
thereby exposes a set of "taxable facts". The Commissioner 
then sets i11 motion the process·to make the appropriate assassment. 
Should the taxpayer wish to challenge the assessment duly issued, 
he can have the matte~ determined by way of proceedings on 
objection as provided for in Part III of the Act. Once bofore 
tho selected forum, 3 the objector is only limjted
4 hy his 
imagination in the range of arguments he may adduce as der1ying 
vindicatio n of the Commissioner's assessment. It is anticipated 
that those arguments may possibly be four in number, as follows. 
NO PROSCRIBED PURPOSE OR EFFECT - ONUS OF PROOF 
Quite clearly the most obvious contention that the objector 
will seek to make is the factuai one that the only purpose or 
effect of the impugned arrangement was to implement an estate 
plan. Alternatively, in the case where the estate plan is 
imp.rnnented to also further some other purpose or of feet, it will 
be contended that the c1voidance of tax uas "a merely incidental 
purpose or effect" and not one "pursued as a goal in itself •••••• 
1 
2 
3 
~ 
~ill at page 258, µer Aickin J. 
13~! 3:.E.l at pago 253, per Bnrwick C • J • 
which will be either the Ta xation RevieLJ Authority or the Supreme 
Court 
provided that the arguments \Jere stated in the grounds of -
objeclior1: section 36(1 ) of the Inland Revenue Department Act 
1974 
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1 (but) arising as a natural incident as some othor purpose . " 
The thrust of thi objector's argument will be to persuade the 
Court, as the taxpayer was able to do in Loador, that an 
' -
examination of· the impugned arrangement discloses that it was 
an estate plnn which was for that reason compelling or desirable. 
Therefore it would have been adopted irrespective of its income 
tax ramific a tions. The cogency of this argument will of course 
depend upon the evidence before the Court in ea~case, yet it 
is non8theless a vital exercin e to elucidate the onus of proof 
set by the Court when determining such issues. 
The initial point to make is that by statute the objector 
bears the onus of proof in these proceedings. 2 However there 
is surprisingly l ittle discussion in the authorities as to what 
• onerous implications - if any - that this may hold for an 
-- , 
objector. There is for example only passing reference to the 
point in Wisheart.
3 
and 1.Qr1d e r, 4 which seems to suggest that 
our Courts do not attach any particular significan ce to the 
statutory p acement of the onus of proof. In this regard, the 
recent rem a ~ks of Bray C.J~ in Jon~ have import a nt implications 
f or_ setting the onerous nature of the standard confronting an y 
disputant estate planner. 
It may be recalled that section 190 of the As sessment Act 
requires the taxpayer to show that the assess me nt is excessive 
in any proceedings challenging it. The effect of that section 
1 
see the discussion at pages 13-14 above and the authorities 
t here not ed . 
2 
see section 33 ( 10) of the Income Tax Act 1976 a nd section 36 
of the Inland Revenue Departm ent Act 1974 
3 
at pa ge 339, per Haslam J. 
4 
at page 475 
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was recently considered by the H:gh Court in Gauci, in connection 
1 
with the purposive of resale provisions of section 26(a). Chief 
Justice Bray considered the test laid down by Sir Garfield Barwick 
' 
in~, and then extended that proposition to encompass 
arrangements reviewed under section 260. So we now find -
"Section 190 does not require the taxpayer to show 
positively that the transactions cannot possibly 
be labelled as a means to avoid tax, or that they 
are only explicable by reference ta ordinary 
business or family dealing. 11 2 
For the purposes of our jurisdiction, acceptance of this 
formulation would entail an important concession far an objector. 
For by the standard set, the objector would not need to "show 
positively" that his impugned arrangement "cannot possibly" have 
• the proscribed purpose or effect. It may be anticipated that 
in those cases where the Court finds the obj ecto r's explanations 
to be not entirely cohesive, such a standard may be vital to the 
outcome. Because here, although the Court may not be completely 
persuaded to the objector's versjon of the actuating reasons, it 
may nonetheless still be sustained as it is not incumbent upon an 
objector to go further and positively demonstrate that the culpable 
purpose could not possibly have also been in mind. This subtle 
but perceptible easing of the burden of proof may thus aid an 
objector in his rebuttal of section 99. However present 
indications are that the lead shown by Chief Justice Bray would 
not be followed in this country. 
In 1Jilli arr§ Prop_§lrty _Q_E1,_velgJJments ~ td, Mr Justice Jeffries 
had occasion to review the subject of burden of proof in relation 
to the question of property acquired with the excisable purpose 
of resale. 3 His Honour's judgment traced through the view of 
Barwick C.J. as to the effect of section 190, firstly when a 
dissontient in Steinbe.!..9., and later when in a majority in Ga1.J.£i. 
1 which correspond approximately with our soction 65(2)(e) 
2 at page 237 
3 und er section 91, in relation to the definition of "trading stock" 
as stnted by that provision. 
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Although not not~ng any ma terial differences between the respective 
legislative analoguos, Jeffries J. expressly refused to follow 
the test proposed by Sir Garfield Ba r wick, finding that that test 
mov e d. the emphasis of the burden of proof away from the plain 
wording of the statute. 1 Instead)Mr Justice Jeffries preferred 
the forceful reasoning of Mason J., 2 who as a dissenter in Gauci, 
endeavour e d to apply the view taken by the majority in St e inberg. 
That being the position, it ma y be exp e cted that with this 
disapprov a l of the source of the rs rn a r ks from which the test 
propounded in Jon EDl, , was drawn, any local court considering the 
problem of onus of proof under section 99 would pr obably decline 
to acc e pt the test formul a ted by Chief Justice Bray in relation to 
section 260. 
With the obligation to discharg e the onus of proof now firmly 
in mind, the degree of severity of th a t ta s k is the next matter th a t 
calls for scrutiny. The first point to note is that the stand a rd 
against Yhich an arrangement is tested under section 99 is an 
objective one. 3 The significance of this stipulation is that it 
is not enough for an objector to merely aver what his actu a ting 
purposes were. He must in addition convince the Court of their 
veracity. For a clear example of an application of this standard, 
reference may be made to the judgment of Casey J. in McDona ld. 
There, the approach taken by his Hono ur wa s to critica lly examine 4 
each of the explanations of the arrang em ent offe r ed by the objector, 
and, finding them wanting, draw the infe r ence of an excisable 
purpose. 
The second aspect of the matter of onus of proof concerns 
the apparent rigorous standard that our Courts apply und e r section 
99. for it is re a dily app a r e nt that our j urisprude nce on section 
99 is permeated by the notion that some commercial or business 
1 at pa ge 141 
2 whi ch in e ss e nc e 1,1 a s th a t sBc tion 1 9 0 did not pl a ce any onu s 
on th e·. Comm i ssi on er to sh ow t ha t th o assessment was corr e ctly 
made. 
4 so o particular ly a t pa go 133 
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efficacy for the impugned arrangement is necessary before 
application of l~e section may be defeated. 1 This can be 
evidenced firstly by pointing out that it may be implied from 
the view argued for above 2 as to the primal basis upon which 
application of the section proceeds. In the nation that 
a pp 1 i c a t ion o f t h e s a c t i on p l' o c e e d s w h e r e t h e C o u r t f i n d s " no 
change" effected by the arrangement in the conduct of the 
taxpaye 's affairs, it is implicit that some sound business 
motivation must then be adduced if invoc atio n of the section is 
to be defeated. Otherwise that will leave as the only possible 
explanation of the arrangement, the fiscal purpose of the desire 
to relieve the burden of income tax. An instance of the line of 
reasoning in mind is afforded by the decision in Grier~.9.!l· 
• There the Court found tl1at whilst the impact of the arrangemont 
3 was only a "paper" one, the c1rrangemont could yet be sustained 
• 
because it furthered the buviness purposes of -
''facilitating changes in partnership personnel and 
to onsure better and more econom·cal control and 
use of equipment 114 
Secondly this point may be illustrated by notin g ~orne of the express 
references tho Cou rts have from time to time made on the point. 
The view of the Courts of paddock trust arrangernentswas sajd to 
1 it may be noted that in.the United States, a "business purpose" 
doctrine has permeated evonue law ince the landmark decision 
in Gr o .S.9.£.Y. Fu rth e 1 mri r O , r o cent in di cations in Can ad a 2 re that 
tt10 jurisprudence there is developing in a simi ar direction -
seo for examplG A.T. Leon - lhou£h not without its disscntients 
see Mas_~f..£.E.ill!~r~. The la t t.er trond is discussed by the 
au t. ho r s ~1 a t h e son , Lfa. r e, and O ' I( e e f e • 
2 particulnrly at pages 17 -18 
3 ._., l C 
c.i page ~1 
L1 
ut page 9 
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be that it "smack_s of businoss unroality 111 whilst the use of a 
service company by a law firm was said not to fall within ''the ambit 
of current business dealing and conform with general legal 
practice.in New Zealand"~ furthermoro, the test propounded by 
Mr Justice Jeffries in TayJ_c_
3 as to what constitutes an 
ordinary ramily dealing is as his Honour expressly acknowledges, 
only a slight relaxation of a commorcial standard. 
The third aspect of the onus of proof concerns the relevance 
4 
to the estate planning contoxt of the pivotal feature upon 
which application of the section proceeds. It rnay perhaps be 
surmised that when a taxpayer reorganises his business affairs in 
fulfillment of an estate plan, the desire to retain control of 
affairs to much the same degree as ~reviously will probably lead 
to little change, in practical terms, in the c6nduct of his 
n.ffairs. Moreover, if other legal personalities (such as a 
family trust or company) are interposed in order to reduce the 
. . 
taxpayer's equity, this will compound the judicial suspicion 
naturally aroused by that other feature of the plan. Hence, 
in the estate planni11g situation - because it necessarily bears 
no commercial rationale - th8 Court may reflexivBly incline to 
perceive artificiality in the arrangenient because all it may 
m1 oun t to i s an " a c co u n t i n g o r pro c e du r a 1 " c h an g e w h o s e on 1 y 
noticeable effect appears ta be to diminish the burdon of income 
tax. 
To pass now from the gonoral to the specific, the fourth 
matter to point out is that the estate planning argument will 
probably be discounted in tho situation where it occurs in the 
context of the reorganisation of an enterprise that depends almost 
entirely upon the cpecialised, personal exertions of tho taxpayer 
1 n~J.!2 at page 597, the Ooard quoting from the judgment of 
Turner J. in the Court below 
2 HasJ.nm J. in lJish..£2...tl, at page 339 
3 cited Rt page 13 above 
4 idontified at pages 17-18 hove 
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himself. The r~asoning in such a case is that as the demise 
of the taxpayer would leavo little or nothing to pass to his 
family, it is unlikely he would be planning for the posthumous 
conduct of his business. This point was made by the Court 
in both Uell.~
1and McDonald, 2 concerning the reorganisation 
of the affairs of a chiropractor and commission agent respectively; 
allegedly for estate planning reasons. 
The fifth point ta make is that it may sometimes be inferred 
that in view of the different nature of the liabilities allegedly 
sought to be avoided, a taxp a yer would be more likely to be 
concerned with the immediate and pressing desire to relieve the 
burden of income tax than he would be to diminish the remoter 
and more imperson a l obligation of estate duty. In Ashton for 
examples the Court of Appeal alluded to this point, where 
McCarthy P. observed -
"it must have been seen by the (taxpa yers) that (the 
arrang ement) wa s more likely to have effect upon charges 
received during their joint lives th a n upgn those 
receiv e d aftor the de ath of·one of them." 
In Ashton the importance of this consideration WclS to furnish 
a point of reinforc e ment to an already skoptical Court. The 
significance of this point may be expected to be to similarly 
influence the Court in those cases that also conce r n a thorough 
reorganisation of the taxpayer's business enterprise. 
The cu mulative effect of each of these points is to clearly 
demonstrate the rigoLous natur e of -the onus of proof confronting 
any estate planner called upon to deny application of the section 
to his erstwhile estate plan. As a fin a l illustration of the 
severe nature of the bur~en of proof, reference may once again 
be made to the decision of Mr Justi c e Jeffries in Tay. es. 
1 at 143 page 
2 at page 1 3 3 
3 at p a ge 328 
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In that case, it rnai be recalled
1 
that the most offensive aspect 
of the arrangemerit was the 5% cum. pref. dividend. To the casual 
observar lhis one foature would not seem to be particularly 
' 
fundament al to· the scheme as a whole to disclose that the avoidance 
2 
o f i n come t a x was " on e £§.0.U:.P 1 Pu r Po s all • Thu s to s e i z e on t hi s 
one minor aspect as revealing a culpable purpose is to apply a 
rigorous standard indeed. The final point to dd is that the 
foregoing a11alysis of New Zealand's jurisprudence plainly 
indicates that the tolerant view currently taken in Australia 3 
of arrangements with estate planning ingredients is not a view 
that may be expected to find favour with our Courts. Indeed 
the difference in standard br:ttween the two jurisdictions has been 
judicially acknowledged. In Halliwell, Ca se y J. notcd 4 the 
"more liberal" view taken in Australia of matters of family 
dealings. Thus it may be said that the estate planner will 
only be able to discharge the heavy onus of proof he bears when 
he is able to completely satisfy the Court of his sincerity to 
only the avowed purpose of estate planning. 
B. THAT THE ARRANGFMENT IS PROTECTED BY ANOTHER SECTION OF THE ACT 
Tha esacnce of this argument is that compliance with the 
terms of come other section of the Act necessaril y protects the 
arrangement from impeachment under section 99. This contention 
contrasts with the point drawn out above, 5 that despite fidelity 
lo one provision of the Act, the problem is still "at la rgo" and 
s e c t i on 9 9 ma y ye t b e in v a k e d • Th e de c i s i on o f r·2 s Ka ..Y. i n 
relation to section 96 was cited in support. However to further 
1 
2 
pointed out at page 13 above 
at page 677, emphasis added. Although it may be acknowledged that 
such a _l ack of proportion may well incline the Court of Appeal to 
take a contrary view of the case when tho appeal lodged in the 
matter is heard. 
3 noted above, particularly at poges 25-29 
4 <=-t ,, 7 ~ page , 
5 at page· 5 
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amplify what the Co~rt of Appoal said in that case, it must be 
added that their ·Honour's were careful to make the reservation 
that "on its own 111 observanco with section 99 would not be a 
case for section 99. The position may now be stated to be 
that compliance with section 96 may normally be expected to be 
a case not within tha scope of section 99, although this will 
not prevent the Court in a proper case moving to apply section 99.
2 
The most likely situation in which the present argument 
will occur is the case where an estate plan is challenged by 
the Commissioner by means of applying section 99 to disallow 
some claim for a deduction (under section 104) that implementation 
of the plan leads to. This contention in turn reduces itself 
to arguing for acceptance in our jurisdiction of the view 
expressed by Dixon C.J. in Cecil Bros., that -
''I have great difficulty in seeing how (section 260) 
could apply to defeat or reduce any deductio~ 
otherwise truly allowable under ~ection 51. 11 
from the volume of judicial comment that this opinion has 
attracted, it is evident that this vieu is perhaps one of the 
most contentious issues of law to arise under both sectiom260 
and 99. It is necessary now torefer to those comments in order 
that some resolution of the issue may be hypothesised. 
(a) In Australia support for the proposition has beon divided: 
in £ecil_gL~~· itself, whilst three other judges in the 
full High Court - Kitto, Taylor and Windeyer J.J.
4 
1 
5 
concurred in Sir Dwan Dixoh's judgmant, both Owen and 
Menzies 6 J.J. expressly disagreed with the Chief 
Justice's vi8l,J. 
at pago 605, per Speight J. See also Turner P., at page 600 
2 it may·be pointed out that in the case where an estate plan leads 
lo a violation of the terms of section 96, the astate planning 
3 
/j 
5 
6 
a gumenl would not bo sufficient to defeat application of that 
section: James 
at paga ~38. Section 51 corre5ponds to our section 104 
see at pa ges 438 and t142 
sitting at first instance, SOO at page 436 
in tho Full High co·urt, at page 4:59 
43. 
1 
i n li.£fl..ls..fll::.~ R £US. M c T i e 1. n a n J • s u g g e s t 0 d t h a t a n y c 1 a i m u n d o r 
sectior 51 was still subject to the "ordinary business 
dealing" test propounded under .section 260. 
in Franklin 1.§_~,oll.§.£WJ2£ Menz.Les J. 
2 repeated the 
position his Honour had taken in Cocil 8£~· 
in J:iLl:.cor.e, Gibbs J., in stating 3 that it was unnecessary 
for the purposes of the prosent case to resolve this 
rift in judicial thinking, may perhaps be taken as 
thinking that the issue was open to further discussion. 
(b) In New Zealand th8re has similarly boen a diversity of 
judicial vi.etJ as to the correctness of Sir. 01.,.1en Dixon's 
1 at 
2 at 
3 al 
4 at 
5 at 
6 at 
7 at 
8 at 
9 :=it 
opir1ion. Tho precodents in point: 
in £1.Pj 9.£l.2::, U o o d ho u s e J • di s cussed the i s sue and he 1 d 
that section 104 could not over.ride the effect of 
Ii 
section 99. On appeal, the contentiori was abandoned. 
in E u r QQ~-(~~ b o t h North P • 5 and Turner J • 6 
concu1red in Sir Owen Dixon's view. On appeal 
to the Privy Council, the majority of the Board 
rofrained 7 from expressing an opinion of the 
applicability of section 99 as tho case had already 
been docided under section 104. The minority of 
their Lo rdsli i ps hot..1e ver dcscr i bed the C omrni ss i oner's 
contention on section 99 as "hopoless 118 • However it 
may be added that Pose 9 makes the point that their 
Lordships prob&bly did not even have in mind the 
present question. 
p8ge 652 
page G89 
page 434 
page 693 
page 389 
page 415 
page 653 
page 659 
rrn9e 23 
! .. 
~ 
I 
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in Ma ngin the Board proceeded to apply section 99 
without any discussion of the possible obstacle posed 
by Cec.iLB.i:o~. This step necessarily implies 
' rejection of the primacy of section 104. 
in Wi r,heart both North P. and Turner J. seemed to recant 
of th eir former views wh en their Honours' unequivocally 
rejected the view of the majority in _Cecil Bro..§_] yet 
without referring ta lheir earlier opinions. 
in fJL.t:.J?..f~? (N_o..:.1J. f"lcMuJ.lin J. thought it now "quite 
clear 112 that section 99 may apply to defeat a claim 
for a deduction under section 104. McCarthy P. in 
the Cou rt of Appeal 3 adopted the view expressed by 
the minority of lhe Board in Europa {fl!o: 1 ).. The Privy 
Council hold that allowancn of the claim in full under 
section 104 would be 11 inconpat iblo 114 with the claim 
being liable to avoidance under section 99. 
Furth crr::ore , their Lords/ ips thought the present case 
was on a 1 fours with Cs~i! Brq_§,. 
in~ Casey J. undertook wh2t was a rather 
lirni tod review of the problem and 011deavoured to 
ration alise the authoriti8S by holding that section 
99 could only be applied where 11 the nee d for. such 
e x p 0 n di tu 1· e ha s b e e n con t r i v e d . " 5 
It is on thes e lines that the differing views &s to the 
relationship between section 104 and section 99 are drawn. In 
. . 
view of tha div ers ity of opinion, it is perh aps a matter of 
conje cture which wa y the issue will ultimately be ro so lved. 
1-lowever th e better view would seem to be th a t followed in the 
1 at 323 and 328-30 res pec tively. se e poges 
2 at 556 page 
3 at 487 pag0 
4 
c."l t 556 page 
5 at 1 3 page 
.Ll.fili.9..~t., lJis.!J.'23.r..i and Manai.Q. line of authority as b·cing one 
consistent with the judicial percoption of the scope of our 
section 99. It may be rocallod that.in M.fK~1., 1 our Court of 
Appeal a~plied the notion that although an irnpugned transaction 
satisfied Urn terms of another soction of the Act, the transaction 
was still "at large" and thon had to face the additional obstacle 
of section 99. But in Australia on the other hand, a clear line 
o f au t ho r i t y rn a y b e t r a c e d t h r o u g h from I< .§Li g h.£ LY.. , C a s u a r i n c1 , 
Patcorc to Mullens; which holds that once particular section of .;,.,;;,..;;..; ... _... 
the Act is satisfied, section 260 cannot be invoked. Hence the 
view expressed by Sir Owen Dixon in .£.ocil_JiE.Q§.• can be seen to 
be consistent with that line of authority, which cor1trasts with 
the broader conceptual scope given by our Courts to section 99. 
So it is on the bc:isis of the differing jJdicia.l conceptions of the 
ambit of the respective provisions that it may be held that 
compliance with section 10~ does not preclude the further inquiry 
as to whether section 99 ha~ beon violatod. 
It remains to deal with the contrary judicial opinion 
preventing acceptancB of this conclusion. The first is the 
pas i ticin ta ken by the Privy Counci 1 in Eurq_pa ( N{). 2 L· HotJover 
tho way open to interpret the opinion of the Board is to hold that 
they were directed to the facts of that particular case. Hence 
• · tho "incompatability" spoken of by the Bo,nd may be said to be 
occasioned by the present matter being a case of "expenditure 
genuinely made." 2 In which case that charact0ristic would make 
the transaction a matter of ordinary business dealing and 
therefore necessarily safe from impeachment under section 99. 3 
1 see at page 5 above. 
2 the test given by the majority in I,\;!.£opa ( !o.11, at page 649 
3 which reasoning could also explair1 the view that Sir Owen 
Dixon exprGssed. If expenditure was 11 necessn1ily incurred in 
t h e p r o du c t i on o f a s s e s s a b l e " i n c m1 e an d h en c e was II p r o pc r l y 
de du c t i b 1 B " u r d e r e c t i o ri 5 1 , _a fp r t i o r l;_ i t u o u J. d be a ma t to r 
of ordinary buriness dealing and 11 ,,, r:ce not cl c3se for 
section 260. Gut it musl ~8 ilcknnuledged that the facts in 
Cec_i J rlros. do not readiJ y J ond thc·r 1solves to this inl£npretalion: 
it 5_s diffjcult to conceive how the, pur c- hc::s0 of trading stock at a 
much ir1flc.1lnd prjco. could bE:' CJet:cribcd as ""n ordinary bus.inrss 
d ea Li n (J u i t, ho u l n e c e s a l' i 1 y b P i n g J a b e l J c d .::w a rr1G a n r; lo a \/ 0 j d ', n x • 11 
-. , 
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This interpretation would seem to be consistent not.only with 
the situation before the Board, but also one in line with the 
rather brief treatment of the whole p~oblem by their Lordships. 
It may b~ expected - as was suggested by CaseyJ. in Halliwell
1 
that if the Privy Council was turning its mind to the broader 
question of the general relationship between sections 104 and 99, 
a more detailed exposition of the problem would have been 
undertaken. 
The second precedent to deal with is the test for mu lated 
by Casey J. in l!a l~ilJ ell. Briefly the facts in that case 
concerned a classic income split arrangernont: sale by a dentist 
to his family trust of the assets utilised in his practice, 
followed by their lease back. The problem though was complicatsd 
by the trust subsequently purchasing, for lease to the taxpayer, 
assets from independant sources for use in the practice. 
Mr Justico Casey went some way to accepting the majority view in 
Cecil Bros., when his Honour· added to the relationship between tho 
two sections the refinement that section 99 could only apply to 
defeat a claim under section 104 when ''the need for such expenditure 
has been contrived. 112 Appl i ea tion of this test. had the rather 
curious result that section 99 could only void the hire of those 
3 assets originally owned by the taxpayer. Yet the terms of his 
Honour ' s judgment did not seek to draw any distinction between 
the "need" on account of which both categories of assets had been 
hired. This consideration would seem to suggest that the real 
basis upon which tho different treatment of the two categories 
of assets rested was whe~er the assets had originally been owned 
by the taxpayer. 
1 at page 12 
2 at page 13 
3 the category of ind8pendant purchases could not be said to be 
11 contrj_ved 11 because the ne ed to hire them was demanded by the 
busin oss . So they may as well be hired from lho family trust 
as anywh8re. Unfortunately his Honour did not proceed to state 
tJhy the same could not be said of the assets sold to the trust. 
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In any event 1 the obscurity of this part of his Honour's 
reasoning aside, it would seem, with all due respect, that the 
test laid down by Casey J. directs attention away from the vital 
inquiry mandated by the predication test whon any matter is 
1 tested under section 99. It has already been noted that the 
essenc8 of the predication test is that -
"yc.u must be able to predicate - by looking at the 
overt acts by which it was implemented - that it 
was implemented in that particular way so as to 
avoid tax. 11 2 
The question required to be asked under this test is not, as 
Casey J. held, whether the need for an expenditure arising from an 
arrangement has been contrived so as to avoid tax. Rather the 
inquiry directed by the test formulated in Newton is to the 
manifestly separate notion as to whether a need that leads to same 
expenditure has been satisfied in a particular way as to disclose 
a culpable purpose or effect. It is the ess0ncs of the predication 
test that the vital inquiry is to examine lhe way in L1hich an 
arr c\D.9 .. Q rim n t is imp 1 e rn en t e_q,, with ·any exam in at i on of the ante c e d ant 
matter of the need which that expenditure reflects not being ta 
the point. On this analysis, Casey J. ought to have scrutinised 
the hire agreements in order to detormine whether they disclosed 
a culpable purpose or off'ect, rather than turn his mind to "the need" 
which those agreements were . the maturation of. The test 
propounded by Mr Justice Casey can be seen then to be inconsistent 
with the conventional approach mandated by the authorities, which 
thus deprives that t est of any comp~lling fo rce . In which case 1 
the view argued for previously may yet be sustainod and section 99 
not be said to be necessarily subject to section 104. 3 
1 at page 5 above 
2 ~wton at page 764 
3 the issue is further debated by Ha~ lsy at page 229, wt1ere soma sound, 
more technical reasons .in support of this conclusion are advanced. 
Moreover if' lhc suggestion mado at fn 3 at page 45 ab~ve be correct, 
it would follow that Sir OtJen Dixon's vieu uould not be tennbJe .in 
role.it.ion to the net., secticn - at J cast in tho case where the 
arrangement has two purpoces or effects. At pages 13-14 above, it was 
pointed out th at mattPrr of ordinary bu siness de a ling a e wiU,.i.n the 
s cope o f t h e s e c t i on , t.J ho r e o r I e p u r· po s e i s t n x a v o i d an c e • I n w h i c h 
cnse. lha just:fication for deductibility would not also neces sarily 
v5.ndicate the r:,c1ttor uncier section 99. 
•  
• 
• 
tin. 
c. THE NEW SOURCE ARGUMENT --n- -- - ,. ___ __ 
The gormination of this argument may be traced to one of the 
four 1 unsolicited general proposition~ thot the Privy Council in 
Europa (No.1.l laid down as applying to section 99. Thus the 
Board statod -
"The sscUon does not strike at new sources of 
income or restrict the right of the taxpayer to 
arrange his affairs in relntion to income from 
a new source in such a way as to attract the loast 
possible .liability to tax. 11 1 
Unfortunately their Lo.dships did not proceed to elucidate 
what was in mind when pronouncing this enigmat ic "now souru:" 
limitation to section 99. Some of the qu est ions that readily 
spring to mind aro preci.soly whet is meant by a "source'' of 
income? How drastic a change has to be made to existing revenue 
in order that subsequonl income r,iay be said to be 11 new"? An 
instance of the type of problems that may bs encountered in 
application of this principle is offered by the recent proposal 
that preferenti.al shareholders ih Europa Oil (N.Z.) Ltd exchange 
their current holdings to a proportionate amount of convertible 
notes. 
2 
Whilst conceptually the nature of the "source" of income 
would be altered, can it be said thet those persons now receive 
income from a " new 11 source? To date , di f fer in g ju di c i a 1 v i G LJ s 
havo been expressed as to the weaning of the exception propounded 
by the Board. Firstly, Mr Justice Casey in Halljw ell undortook 
a rather brief discussion of the question, and formulated the 
pr·oposi tion that -
1 
2 
3 
at 
"a new source of income (to which the arrehgement 
under attach relates) depends on a commo n-sense 
apprcJis a l of the physical source itsolr, as well 
as the tnxpayer's interest in it, and of any other 
relevant circumstances. 11 3 · 
page 55G 
Naliona Businc-ss Review 14 SBrtember 1977, page 8 
at page 15 
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That being the case, his Honour went on to hold that the 
income derivGd from a professional practice upon its complete 
take-over by the taxpayer could not b,e said to be "new 11 because 
the taxpayer had previously been a (junior) partner in that 
practice. This view his Honour noted was consistent with the 
decision in Wisheart, where the impugned arran~ement was 
implemented upon a change of partners. Yet no significance 
was attached to the impugned reorganisation as to suggest that 
it led to a transformati on of income outside the scope of the 
section. 
By way of contrast to Mr Justice Casey's view, reference may 
be ma de to the opinion expressed by Sir Garfield Barwick in 1 Mul}ens. One of the reasons for the insistence by his Honour 
for an antecedant transaction that is recast in a tax avoiding 
form before section 260 can apply, was that "by parity of 
reasoning" the new source of income limitat ion may extend to "a 
new basis for a deduction. 112 The view of his Honour would appear 
to give a very literal meaning to the principle and hold that 
without that earlie~ analogous transaction, every reorganisation 
leads to a "new" source of incomo or a "new" right to a deduction, 
as the case may be. This view would plainly all but emasculate 
section 260. However it may be cogently argued that similar 
·• reasoning would not be applicable under section 99. Firstly 
the germination of his Honour's view has been traced back 3 to 
the contention made when appearing as counsel before the Board 
• 
in Newton. Yet that argument was _unambiguou s ly rejected by the 
Board, it being held that the section did .have prospective effect. 4 
Second ly the decision of our Court of Appeal i~ MartiQ5 m- y be 
cited as an instance where section 99 has been applied despite 
the absence of an antecedant transaction. 
1 noted at fn 1, at page 24 above 
2 see ~u l ens, at pag e 510 
3 also noted at fn 1s at page 24 above 
4 at nage 763. A proposilian affirmod in Mangin, at page 59~ 
5 in orc.Jer to deny the benefit of ea rying ror wc1rd accum ulated losses, aa provided for under the former section 188 
• 
• 
so. 
Presont indications are that our Courts' are inclined to 
treat the "new source" limitation cautiously, holding that some 
sort of radical transformcttion to existing revenue is necessary 
befo;e the exc~ption can be establish~d.
1 
In the estate 
planning context, that view would still leave room for contention 
in the situation where there is a reorganisntion of affairs, 
so that existing income becomes sufficiently altered in character 
as to support the argument that it is now revenue derived from 
a "nelJ source". It remains to be seen what guidelines future 
Courts establish as applying to the principlej ~hough the view 
of Sir Garfield Barwick may bu noted as offering an indication 
of the wide potential that the principle holds. 
D. RE CONS I.Wd£I1..QM PR OBLEf~S 
If each of the three arguments advanced abov~ fail to 
persuade the Court to overrule the Comm issioner's assossment 1 
an objector may yet·still escape an application of section 99 
because of the inability to ne gate the effect of the culpable 
transaction. Subsection (3) authorises the Commissioner to 
make an adjustment of the assessable income of any person 
affected by a tax avoidance arrangement so as to counteract 
any tax advantage obtained thereby. In which case, subsection 
(4) deems the income assessed to such persons to be derived by 
2 that person and not any other person. Of the problems that 
may arise under this aspect of the section, it has already been 
noted that -
1 
2 
3 
"the concept of a tax advantage does mean that the 
taxpayer can argue that if the arrangement had 
not been entered into he would not have derived as 
income sums which, under the arrangement , he 
appears to have avo·ded.3 
essentiaJ.ly the view argued for by the commentators. See for 
examp e rose at page 26, Harley at page 227. 
which deam·ng provision, curiously enough, does not extend to 
tran~aclions of a kind dealt with by subsection (5); 
Congrevo at page 313 
• 
1 
• 
51 • 
In other words, there lJ.ill be no "tax advantage" because 
if the taxpayer had thought that the transaction under review 
i..., a s go i n g to b e s t r u ck dawn b y an a p p_l i c a t ion o f s e c t ion 9 9 , 
then he would hot have entered into it. Ergo there has been 
no "advantage 11 obtained in his fiscal position. It would 
seem unlikely that a Court would accept such reasoning, at least 
as a general proposition, for to sustain it would plainly be 
to all but emasculate the section. Moreover, some support 
for this conclusion may be dra1.,m from the speech of Lord Uilberforce 
in Parker. There his Lord~hip made some comments about the 
definition of "tax advantage" given by what is now the proviso 
to section 460(5) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970; 
in relation to transactions in securities. Of that 
statutory definition, his Lordship observed -
'' ( the definition) presupposes a situation in which 
an assessment to tax, or increased tax, eithur is 
made or may possibly bo made, that the taxpayer is 
in a position to resist the assessment by saying 
that the way in which he received what it is sought 
to tax, prevents him fro~ being taxed on it; and 
that the Revenua is in a position to reply that if 
he had received what it is sought to tax in another 
way he would have had to bear tax. In other words, 
there must be a contrast, as regards the 'receipts ' 
between the actual case where theso accrue, in a 
non-taxable way wilh a possible accruer in a 
tax2hle uay, and, unless lhis contrast exists, th'r 
existence of the advantage is not established." 
at page 415. And followed b,, the House in Cl~£U· These 
remarks m0y be said to he in point, for the turms of the 
definition upon whirh they are based ara evon more narrowly 
drawn lhan the matters alluded to in paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of subsection (3). 
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The essence of· th's definition then is that it postulates that 
there must be a contrast between the "actual" nnd the "possible" 
before there can be said to be a tax advantago. . In which case, 
• it would not be incumbent upon the Revenue to show that there was 
•  
an imperative transaction carried out, in the most advantageous fiscal 
manner before there can be said to be a "tax advantage". 
However this definition was stated in the relatively straight-
forward context of where there is only tho one transaction under 
review. Much more difficult questions arise wh on the conduct 
of a business is under review, for here the Court may be called upon 
to make suppositions in order that the requisite contrast may be 
drawn. The type of problems that may arise in this sort of 
situation are indicated by the facts in O' Knne Construction _.hj:d. 
Briefly the facts in that case were that the principal shareholder 
in the taxpayer established a family trust, to which he sold and 
took a lease back of the company's earthmoving equipment. The 
trust then bought a farm and, some eighteen months later, purchased 
a machine (id entified as a "TD 25") for use in the business of both 
the taxpayer and on the farm. Henry J. held that whilst the initial 
sale and lease back transaction could be voided, the purchase of th e 
TD 25 and its hire to the comp ny could not be. Ono of the reasons 
hy was because it tr ansp ired that there was a choice to aithBr buy 
or hire a machine like th e TD 25, so that it was an acceptable businGss 
transaction for the trust to choose to buy the machine. 1 
This decision then illustrates the point that the Commissioner 
may have difficulty supporting his assessment in cases where there is 
so me change in the modus operandi of the taxpayer'~ business 
subsequent to implementation of the impugned arrangement. for in 
such a situation, the Court may be called upon to speculate or make 
very hypothetical assumptions as to the course of conduct that might 
have b~en followed if the arrangement had not been entered into. 
And this might draw the Court, no doubt reluctantly, into what one 
Judge rather colourfully termed "the 1..1orld of fiscal fantasy". 2 
1 see at page 57-8 
2 Wilson J. in~ at page 281 
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Thus the importance of any argument bas~d uppn a misconceived 
6. reconstruction may be expected to depond v0ry much upon the 
timing of an application of soction 9,9, as the decision in O'Kane 
Construction Ltd indicates that the fruits of a tax avoidance 
scheme may yot be still enjoyed where discretionary dealings 
subsequent to its implementation occur. This is because those 
later events do not in such a case readily enable a contrast ta 
be drawn with the possible course of ev0nts if the arrangement 
had not been entered into in order that a "tax advantage" may be 
hypothesised. 
• 
E. SUMMARY 
The erstwhile licence of a taxpayer to organise his affairs 
to pay less tax than he otherwise might throws into sharp relief 
the conflict between this sovereignty of the individual and the 
noed to safeguard the interests of the fisc in cases where a taxpayer 
makes arrangements that purport to diminish bath prospective fiscal 
burdens, In these cases, where the taxpayer may be seen to be 
arguing for the best of both uorlds, it perhaps should not be 
surprising that the Courls are wary of the argument that asserts 
as a justification for a diminuation of the perennial burden, tho 
desire to reduce the posthumous levy. This suspicion is 
manifested firstly in the insistence that the arguiilent may be made 
only from the proper source _ - that it be disclosed by an examinatio11 
of the terms of the plan itself. With that obstacle surmounted, 
the second problem is to persuade the Court of sincerity to the 
avowed purpose. The current stat~ of o~r jurisprudence reveals 
that this will only be achieved when the saving in income tax is 
an unsolicited advantnge and is seen not to be a feature expressly 
embodied in the plan itself. This situation contrasts with that 
obtai~ing in Australia, where the trend of present authority is 
to accord exercises in matrimonial asset sharing - which ericompass 
estate planning objectives -a ctanding outside the range of that 
jurisdicilion'c. ]eg.i.slative annlogue, HmJever, when an estate 
planner is callod upon to deny an applicntion of section 99, it 
I is apparent that hG foces a rigorous task in discharging the onus 
of proof th a t he bears. The emphasis in the authorities ·is lo 
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look for some business or commercial motivation that furnishes 
• a rationale of tho arrangement, yet in the estate planning context 
this is manifestly an onerou s requj re,ment to satisfy. Thus of 
-. . , 
• 
the estate planning argument> the view is offered that our Courts 
do not view the contention as some sancrosanct or invoilablc 
argument whose elucidation nocossarily protects an estate plan 
from impeachment under section 99. Rather its adducemont does 
not preclud e the pragmatic approach of a careful scrutiny of the 
material facts in order to determin e the veracity of the contention 
and an absence of the proscribed purpose or effect. Thon and 
only then may an estate plan escape the thundor of section 99. 
• 
• 
A • 
APPENDIX 
PARTS I ANO II 
Section 99 of the Income Tax Act 1976: 
{1~ _For· tho purposes of this section -
"Arrangement" means any contract, agreement, plan, or 
understanding (whether enforceable or unenforceable ) 
including all steps and transactions by uhich it is 
carried into effect: 
"Liability" includes a potential or prospective liability 
in respect of future income: 
"Tax avoidance" includes -
( a) Directly or indirectly altering lhe incidence of 
I 
any income tax: 
( b ) Directly or indirectly relieving any person from 
liability to pay income tax: 
( c ) Directly or indirectly avoiding, reducing, or 
postponing any liab~lity to income tax. 
( 2 ) Every arrangement made or entered into, whether before or 
after the commer1cement of this Act, shall be absolutely void as 
against the Commissioner for income tax purpose& if and to the oxtent 
that, directly or indirectly -
{a ) Its purpose or effect is tax avoidance; or 
( b) Where it has 2 or more purposes or effects, one of 
its purposes or effects (not being a merely 
incidental purpose or effect) is tax avoidance, 
wheth0r or not any other or othors of its purposes 
or effects relate to, or are referable to , ordinary 
bu~iness or family dealings , -
whether or not any person .affected by that arrangement is a party 
thereto. 
( 3) Where an arra~gement is void in accordance with subsection 
( 2 ) of this ection, the assessable income and the non-assessable 
income of any person affected by that arrangement shall be adjusted 
in such manner as the Commissioner considers appropriate so as to 
~ counteract any tax advantage obtained by that person from or under 
that arrangement, and, without limiLing th generality of the foregoing 
provisions of this subsection, the Commissioner may have rogard to 
such income as, in hia opinion, either -
,./ 
,,_ 
B. 
(a) That person would have, or might be expected ta have, 
or would in all likelihood have, derived if that 
arra~gsment had not been made or entered into; or 
(b) That person would have derived if he had beon entitled 
to.the benefit of all income, or of such part thereof 
as the Commissioner considers proper, derived by 
any other person or persons as a result of that 
arrangement. 
(4) Where any income is included in the assessable income or, 
as the case may be, in the non-assessable income of any person 
pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, then, for the purposes 
of this Act, that income shall be deemed to have been derived by 
that person and shall be deemed not to have been derived by any other 
person. 
(5) Without limiting the generality of the foregoing provisions 
of this section, where, in any income year, any person sells or 
otherwise disposes of any shares in any company under an arrangement 
(being an arrangement of the kind referred to in subsection (2) of 
this section) under which that person receives, or is credited with, 
or there is dealt with on his behalf, any consider ation ( whether in 
money or money 's worth) for that sale or other disposal, being 
consideration the whole or, as the case may be, a part of which, 
in the opinion of the Commissioner, represents, or is equivalent 
to, or is in substitution for, any amount which, if that arrangemont 
had not been made or entered into, that person would have derived 
or would derive, or might be expected to have derived or to derive, 
or in all likelihood would have derived or would derive, as income 
by way of dividends in that income year, or in any subsequent 
years or otherwise howsoever, an amount equal to the valuo of that 
consideration or, as the case may be, of that part of that 
consideration shall be daomed to be a dividend derived by that 
person in that first-mentioned income year. 
(6) ·contains bridging provisions in respect of arrnngements 
made or entered into before the section came into force, on the 
1st day of October 1974. 
' 
-
' 
' 
• 
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